In Ukraine, mobile air defense groups are criticized in Russia - in Russia copy the experience: what is the actual efficiency of MVG
Oleg Petrenko, the head of the Headquarters Fund of the Third Army Corps, stated that mobile air defense groups are exhibited by the use of the Russian Kamikadze Russian Drone Droami-Drone Droam, while aviation and radio electronic wrestling (HRS) show much better results. Petrenko indicated that the effectiveness of such groups in the destruction of drones can now be evaluated as "a little more than zero percent".
According to him, modern Iranian drones of the Shahamed type are equipped with 16- or 32-struggle transmitters, which significantly complicates their suppression. Earlier, the military said, there were enough 8 HCPs to reach one zone, but today it takes 16 or even 32. Thus, the advantage is moving to those forces that have a sufficient amount of electronic warfare or aviation capabilities.
Petrenko also emphasized the prospect of using drones, which are already used to protect Kyiv and other Ukrainian cities. These drones are able to directly counteract the Shahanedam in the air, preventing them from achieving goals. Earlier, the Armed Forces Major Yuriy Fedorenko, commander of the 429th separate regiment of Achilles unmanned systems as part of the forces of unmanned the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces, urged civilians to join the beat of drones.
According to him, those who have the opportunity should immediately arrange permission to the gun - pump or semi -automatic - and learn how to shoot it qualitatively and safely. Back in June, the Commander -in -Chief of the Armed Forces General Alexander Sirsky reported that about 40 percent of Russian "Shahaneda" in Ukraine was beating the forces of mobile fire groups.
The lesions and disposal of the rest of the enemy drones are due to the use of traditional air defense, fighter and army aircraft, CLOs and anti -aircraft drones. However, today, his words are denied by Oleg Petrenko calling the efficiency of the MVG at the level of "slightly more than zero percent". Military expert Dmitry Snegirev explains that the mobile fire group is not a separate "button" in the air defense system, but an element of a multi -level defense network.
The main difference is mobility: such units can move quickly, change positions and respond to a dynamic change in the trajectories of goals. In their arsenal mainly large-caliber small arms (large-caliber machine guns), portable anti-aircraft missile complexes (MSRCs) and other low and medium range. Thanks to this, they are designed to cover strategic objects in conditions where stationary systems cannot always give an quick response to the enemy maneuvers.
It is mobility that allows groups to respond promptly when the "swarm" of drones changes the course - the threat sector changes, so static complexes can remain outside the response area. "Much of the attacking unmanned complexes uses cheap" omen "(imitation goals) that produce almost" on their knees "and which aim to distract precious air defense products. Such" omen "can be fixed by radars as drones and" eat "rockets and resources - because the reply to them.
It turns out to be more efficient and economically expedient to neutralize mobile fire groups (large -caliber machine guns, portable complexes) than to spend missile remedies.
According to the expert, a critical argument for the benefit of mobile groups: if they were really ineffective, the enemy would not have taken over this experience - instead, Russia has appeared in Russia with its own mobile units covering strategic objects - "Stalin Falcons" as an example of translating Ukrainian practice into Russian such experience.
There is a version that a mobile firing group discredit campaign can have intra -organizational motives: they say that the resources (especially human) from the infantry to the infantry can be profitable to other structures or individual political/military figures. If the mass transfer of voluntary formations of territorial communities (DFTG) and similar units in the assault/infantry units begins, it will actually weaken one of the layers of our multi -level air defense.
"Technically, those people who are under armor are difficult to simply translate into infantry - this is not an instant reorganization process. Therefore, such statements are interpreted as part of an information operation or political pressure - and not as exclusively a professional military assessment," the expert says. However, if mobile fire groups really cut or translate into assault units, the consequences can be serious: the air defense will appear in a small and medium -range response.
"Aircraft system is a multi-level structure: from a distant radius (eg, Patriot or others) to medium (NASAM, other means) and small (anti-aircraft installations, MAZRK, cheetahs, etc. ). Mobile groups are an important link at the level of small lesions and a flexible cover. Objects will simply remain "vulnerable" in the interval between stationary means, " - continues Snegirev.
According to the expert, the discussion about zero efficiency of mobile fire groups looks not just as a technical dispute, but as part of a broader information and organizational game. It can be a revision of tactical placements and a real change in the structure of air defense forces - and not always for the better to defend the critical infrastructure.
But the expert once again emphasizes that if the Ukrainian MVG were not really effective, the enemy would not have taken over this experience and practice that Ukrainians initiated in 2022. We will remind, Russian shock drones-Kamikadze "Shahamed", originally sharpened for the destruction of static goals, were modified for attacks on moving purposes.
At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began to use them more often near the front line, which became an additional threat to the defense forces. Focus also wrote that Sergei Flash Non -Kindnov noted that one of the "Shahmed", used during the attack on the train, on the tail had an antenna, and in the front - a camera. It was a drone with an online management that attacked the railway on the Nizhyn plot. The operator went to the target repeatedly, trying to optimally strike.