Special forces of the Russian Federation in the Ukrainian rear: what do the enemy battle groups do on the front line
However, the usual way for Russian commanders to achieve this (increasing the number of armored vehicles in advanced units, which is involved in the use in attacking/assault actions, as well as increasing the intensity of artillery and aviation support for the actions of land troops) does not always give the desired effect.
Therefore, in order to create convenient and favorable conditions for further promotion of their advanced units in the strips of the 2nd and 41st General Army (ID), the enemy's command provided the active use The Armed Forces earlier, from the intelligence units and parts of special purpose operating in the lanes of the 2nd and 41st general military armies: the main tasks for such groups were defined by the Russian command: also, to achieve the desired effect, the Russian command created and obviously try to use the closest ones Sometimes a number of so -called "raid groups", formed from the composition of consolidated tactical units (battalions) of both Brigades of the SPP operating as part of these all -military armies.
It is expected that they will act on high -pass and high -speed transport or combat equipment. There is nothing unusual about this. The Russian command still tried to actively use its army "special forces" directly, in the process of conducting more or less significant offensive actions.
In particular, both of the above SPP teams (3rd and 24th SPP) are considered to be one of the most active on the front, which have been sufficiently significant, as for the SPP formations, losses: one brigade (3rd SPP) lost killed and wounded over 200 V/Sl, other (24th SPP)-more than 330 in/sl. However, for the first time the enemy is going to use all this so massively and concentrated (SPP+military intelligence) in a relatively narrow lane.
As for me, it testifies to the important importance that the Russian command is the offensive actions of the "Center". Probably, the enemy is preparing for the next stage of improvement of the system of operational management of troops in a number of operating areas.
In particular, the transfer of the Toretsky direction of the 51st General Army (ID) who forgot is in the past-the "1st Army Corps (AK)", the so-called "People's Milcy" (NM) "DNR", which is close to the strip The actions of the 3rd name (the former "2nd AK" NM "LNR") obviously testifies to the intention to reduce both of these "armies" into a separate group of troops (UV) with some banal name such as "Donbass" (or something similar ).
At the same time, most likely, the 51st General, together with the Toretsky direction, will be expelled from the Center in the Center, and the 3rd General, respectively, together with the Kramatorsk direction-from the warehouse "Yug".
Given the fact that the Kurakhiv direction was also added to the enemy's center, which now leads an offensive in the Pokrovsky direction, and the 3rd name of the enemy was in the Yug Yug, in fact, hostilities , so to speak, "on the landlands", to the north of the Toretsky direction, such reformatting seems quite logical and adequate. Obviously, both "armies" will receive some single command "instance" (earlier this function was performed Command and, accordingly, the troops (UV) on the front.
It is also possible that, for the sake of greater concentration of efforts and improving the level of control of troops and their interaction, it will be "reformatted" in the "Yug", which is now concentrated on the carbon (or, better to say, Kurakhiv-Vougledar) direction. At this time, "in the interests of" Yug "there are the following forces and means: except for the 8th name, these all formations are not from the south (YUVO), but" from the East "-Sakhalin, Transbaikalia, Pacific Fleet, etc.
(namely - from the "East of the Military District"). It would be logical that they would be part of UV "Vostok", not "Yug", or to an 8th-beast, which "by staffing" enters Yvo, would join in the 18th and 58th name as part of the Dnepr (reduced in general in "Yug"). As far as I understand, the stay of the 8th name in Donetsk and Mariupol directions was due to the fact that it included in the Donbass "People-Ahilician" 1st and 2nd AK.
But now these are separate independent all-military armies, so the stay of the 8th name "beyond" of its "native" district, or, better to say, the strips of action in "Dnepr" raises, say, certain questions.
When I talk about reformatting the management (command) of certain WSCs, the strips of their action, I call the numbers of joints and associations that are part of their composition, it should be borne in mind that any such actions are very often very often There is also a need to perform a considerable amount of work on the practical movement of troops (in particular, on the new place of their command structures and "verticals", headquarters, rear organs, etc. ).
That is, to move from the same army to another, for example, only one motor -rifle brigade (well, or regiment) in practice means the movement of all its units (and their staffs), brigade headquarters, brigade rear, stocks and resources of its battalions and divisions, etc. These are many people, OVTs, cars, MTZ items and much more. Now imagine what it means to move (regroup) the all -military army, or most of the troops (forces) of the district.
Therefore, when the Russians begin to "mess" with their structure of command (management) at different significant levels (division - army \ Army Corps - District), it happens "not from a good life. " In most cases, this is a very urgent need \ need.
The state of reserves of the enemy (implies the so-called "operational reserve of the first stage", that is, ready to enter into battle for 24 hours) in a number of directions indicates that the command of the enemy, in fact, has already introduced into battle in these directions greater Part of what planned . . .
I will not now list the numbers of units and parts that make up the reserve of a group of enemy (I do not mention the connection, they simply are not in its reserve, the maximum is a regiment of incomplete composition). Only one example. Toretsky direction - storming by storm, attack by attack, the enemy breaks through the center of Toretsk. And in the reserve of the 51st "Army", which is all engaged in it, only one "motorized" battalion of the 132nd OMSBR.
Personnel-less than 300 "chromium, oblique and poor", and 3 more BBM and 3 guns (I suspect, which for one reason or another do not shoot). This is called "Operational Reserve of the First Queue. " That is, everything that gives signs of life in the entire 51st name is already thrown in Toretsk and Neplipivka and is ruthlessly lured by the Russian command in numerous assaults and attacks.
And so it happens with everything that falls into the strip of not only the 51st ID, but also other connections and associations of the enemy as a replenishment. In other words, in the reserve, the Russian command, in fact, is not delayed, everything rushes into battle. That is why, I believe that October, and possibly November, in fact, become a moment of maximum stress of the parties of the parties throughout the 2024 campaign.