The Russian Federation began to supply radars and air defense to Iran: what is bad for the reputation of Russian "defense"

Supplies from the Russian Federation can potentially lead to deficiencies in advanced Russian systems. Israel has already demonstrated that Russian air defense was vulnerable. Iranian officials invited military equipment in Russia, and the Russian Federation has already started supplying radars and air defense to Tehran, and with staff. But this step can cause serious reputational damage to the Russian Federation, as Israel has already attacked Iran and Russian air defense systems have not coped.

Forbes reports. The report does not specify what type of equipment Russia supplies. Iran is interested in the acquisition of a strategic air defense system C-400 "Triumph". Tehran has already acquired the advanced S-300PMU-2 2016 systems from Moscow, as well as operating Russian Buk and Thor systems. Iran also puts pressure on Russia to put them with Su-35 Flanker fighters, which Tehran ordered in 2021, as reported by two high-ranking sources in Iran. Iran is expecting at least two dozen aircraft.

Previous reports of their rapid supply have proven to be premature or frankly false. However, any supply of military equipment from the Russian Federation to Iran may now be risky for Moscow. Iran vowed to attack Israel after the elimination of political leader Hamas Ismail Khania on July 31 in Tehran. Any Iranian attack is likely to entail an answer to Israel and test in the battle of Russian equipment. Such a scenario is not just hypothetical.

When Iran began an unprecedented shelling of Israel with the help of drones and rockets, Israel responded by the destruction of Radar Iranian S-300PMU-2 in the central district of Isfahan, near the main Iranian enrichment enterprise in Nathan. Israel trained to strike the S-300 for more than ten years before the strike of Isfahan.

He was trained against the Greek C-300 PM-1-1, based on the island of Crete, in 2013, receiving valuable information about its capabilities and potential vulnerabilities, which she could once use against the Syrian or Iranian system. In the same year, Israel opposed the supply of S-300 Damascus by Russia, even hinting that it intends to prevent any Syrian C-300 to prevent it before they start acting.

Russia really put C-300 in Syria in different circumstances in 2018, but most importantly, it did not pass it on completely Syrian military. In fact, this meant that Syria did not have permission to use a strategic system that remained under the control of the Russian military. The Syrian C-300 was launched once in 2022 and unceremoniously removed from the country shortly after that it clearly demonstrated that Syria never really possessed it or controlled it.

One of the main reasons why Russia probably did not want Syria to use it, except for the desire to avoid any war between Israel and Syria, was the fear that the S-300 would not be very effective or even destroyed. Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested in 2019 so that Saudi Arabia would buy Russian S-300 or C-400 systems, as Iran and Turkey did, not Western systems to protect its infrastructure, which suffered an unprecedented attack of drones.

But after Russia began a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Armed Forces destroyed many modern Russian systems, including C-400 in Crimea. And the interest in the supply of Russian weapons in the world has decreased significantly, as they proved to be ineffective and vulnerable. The supply of Iran's advanced weapons in the midst of confrontation with Israel can lead to similar negative results for Russia if there is a significant escalation.

Putin probably does not want such a result, at least partially because it can interfere with the supply of Iranian drones and other equipment for his army. Although it is unclear that Russia is now supplying it, it is unlikely that Iran will significantly strengthen its defense-for example, C-400 or Su-35 squadron in a short time. However, even if it supplies advanced components for future or existing Iranian systems, Israel can still decide or sabotage them while they are still in storage.

Such a step can simultaneously interfere with Iran to modernize its armed forces and demonstrate the sustainable opposition of Israel to the supply of Moscow by advanced weapons of Tehran. All these factors indicate that Russia again risks the reputation of its domestic weapons, which has already been affected by Ukraine. In this case, her willingness to do so may emphasize how dependent on Iranian goodwill she has become in the last two and a half years.