There is no Crimea - no peace. Why cannot be finished war leaving Russia's peninsula

And deeply subjective tendency conclusions that will probably offend the feelings of believers. 1. It seems to me that at the time of the war, the Kremlin did not have a clear plan to "seize and attach Crimea". Such a result was not determined in advance, it formed in the course of events. They were certainly (they were theoretically about defense). There was a power component and a network on Earth.

There was knowledge that almost all the power leadership of Ukraine (in the NSDC, the Minister of Defense, the chairman of the SBU, the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, etc. ) citizens and/or agents of Russia. And the tactics (which is still used now) has been honed over the decades: pressed as long as it is squeezed. Against this background, they made a political decision to "press".

If Yanukovych in some form preserved at the head of the state, I think, at that time illegal annexation would not hurry to draw up, would fight for more. They would use the weakening mode for hybrid power penetration and expanding all forms of presence in the south and east. What would still lead to a military clash soon, probably even more tragic for Ukraine. 2. When the pressing team began to be embodied, Ukrainian power verticals were paralyzed.

The military and intelligence services did not receive adequate teams, many officials took advantage of the loophole to dodge decisions in the face of uncertainty, so that they would not be responsible for nothing. I remember the time perfectly. Feeling complete hopelessness. When the information was, but just had to pass it on for action. 3. The repel could come 1) as a reaction of the event and 2) as a reaction of citizens.

The event was as shameful as possible, limited by the Obama decorative decree to impose sanctions two weeks after the occupation began. A vivid illustration of the principle of "too little - too late". The resistance of the population has turned on the delay. For obvious reasons. On the one hand, people were confused and frightened. It was difficult to believe in what happened. Many were difficult to form their attitude. Especially - taking into account the dominance of Russia in information space.

On the other hand, there were mistakes in the first days of the first days. I am convinced that the abolition of the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko language law is a tragic mistake. It is the most untimely solution that seriously facilitated the task of the enemy. I think if Moscow faced the opposition at the international level, then in that situation in Sevastopol it would be preserved, but for Crimea it would be possible to fight.

(I consciously write nothing about the resistance directly in the Crimea itself in late February - spring 2014. The participants of the events will be written about this in due time. Because the current picture is distorted). As a result, Putin was able to bring the game to a difficult and bug: he formally included the occupied Crimea and Sevastopol in the Russian Federation. 4. If you look through the lens of those events, connections with the present are very convex.

When today I read comments about the next "historical" speech of some Western politician, who saw and/or "opened the eyes" of the world, I mentally play bingo. Fixing what many in Ukraine have shouted since 2014, the thesis that they have not yet been fully voiced in the west and are danced verbally: a reactive position is an evil, it is a dead end and a clear loss. From the end of 2020, this thesis was voiced by the Ukrainian side at all thematic meetings that I can judge.

The aggressor always wins, "restraint" postfactum - does not work. The only chance to prevent negative scenarios is proactive actions, preventive. And it will not be a provocation. With the contrary, it is the best antidote. But it is scary because it changes all the strategies. The second point: the desire of Western partners is not as necessary, but as comfortable. And to demand from the victim of aggression not to disturb this comfort. What in 2014, which in 2022.

Therefore, an applied conclusion is that when it comes to Russians, you need to make the most crazy resistance. For any intentions. Let it look like a disproportionate use of force - no matter. If you do not exacerbate "do not sharpen" - everything will end badly. And so there will be a chance. The third point. Since 2014, partners have repeatedly reported that the occupation of Crimea has completely changed the context. The capture and illegal inclusion of Crimea is not only an attack on Ukraine.

Among other things, it is the undermining of two fundamental ideas of the world order: if the country is a permanent member of the UN RB attacks the foundation on which the world is based, the consequences will accurately touch everyone. Not only Europeans. If the Kremlin can occupy the Black and Azov Sea - why cannot hooliganize Huligan? Anyone who has strength or situational opportunity to impose their requirements will be able to play without rules.

Accordingly, it is possible to roll this situation only by turning Crimea. And this is the common interest of all for whom these ideas are important. Of course, there are those who would like to view them for their reasons, because on the planet there are hundreds of conflicts and points of fault. Therefore, the consequences should be weighed. 5. As for the Crimea itself. In 10 years, much has changed. When the time comes, it will be the return of another Crimea to another Ukraine.

Therefore, models need to be worked out, but any attempts to pedal some obsessive ideas about a lifestyle on the peninsula is a waste of time and a way to eat. Now the main thing is that the idea of ​​Crimea as a naval fortress is seriously blown up. The continuation of this thought is a demilitarized zone. And some format of international guarantees to make money there. There are many forecasts for Crimea, but the fact is that Crimea is no longer brackets.