We calculate Russian reserves: how many more they will be able to attract the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Kursk direction

I was asked here, recently, what forces and means of command of the enemy can involve the situation in this direction to "stabilize", and in the future - to attempt to knock the Armed Forces outside my own border in the Kursk region. So, let's try to understand if possible. 1. First of all, it is about the troops (forces) of the "Leningrad Military District" (Lvo), he is a group of troops (UV) "Sever" (commandant-Mr. Lapin).

Who has forgotten, these are those connections and associations of "Lvo" of the enemy, the parts and units of which can appear "under the curl" first. Although in practice there are many problems of "current" nature that interfere with this or significantly limit the possibility of the Russian command of the appropriate level to recover the above forces and means in "full format".

These can be the use of the main components of the specified forces and means in other operating directions, or a significant "shoulder" maneuver, which will adversely affect the terms of concentration and deploy In the Kursk operating direction, and, without prior preparation or significant completion of O/s and OVT, in the mode "from the course".

For example, the battalions of the 200th OMSBR, apparently, are now involved in the fighting in Kramatorsk, north of the city of Yar, so it will be difficult to completely remove them from there.

Or the 14th AK, whose crews are involved in the Dnieper direction, or 336-sh the MP, which is one of the "main" compounds in the lane of the 5th TEA of the enemy also, in this sense are "problematic", and so on Further, it is obvious that to gather in the Kursk operating direction a quick and structured grouping of troops from the "regular" troops (forces) in "Sever", which will "solve significant in volume and depth of the task" (for example, to suppress the Armed Forces in general in general The interpretations of the Seimas and the Pselae beyond the state border), the Russian command is unlikely to be able to soon.

In other words, at this point, it can act in the Kursk operating direction with a "salt" and solely to solve a limited range of tasks. For example, to keep certain areas and borders, to cover important communications and infrastructure objects and to generally try to prevent the process of growth and improvement of the Ukrainian bridgehead in Kurshchyna. 2. However, it will not last a long time. The Russians will over time pull more and more troops. They are already trying to do it.

As for me, in the sense of formation and deployment of an additional grouping of enemy troops in the Kursk operating direction, it is worth expecting a certain "inter -operative" regrouping of a certain set of Russian troops from the Wauck, Yug and East ".

Probably about the 1st tank army (and), and most likely about its 47th tank Division (TD) from Kupyansk direction, 3rd Army Corps (AK) in the 6th MSD and 72nd OMSBR from Kramatorsk, or even parts and units of the 35th ID, from the Pologovsky direction.

This development is evidenced by the fixation of the units of the 83rd Airborne Assault Brigade (ODSBR) and the 810th and 155th MPs, which, as they say, were in the Russian command " At the moment - at the hand "and arrived in the strip of" Sever "clearly not for blocking the Ukrainian offensive in the Kursk direction, but for increasing efforts in the Volchansk region.

But as far as I understand, the enemy will still have to use some of these forces in the Kursk direction, not for "Vovchansky assaults". And again, in this sense, the Russian command will need to "break the head" over what and how to replace, for example, the 47th TD, which obviously plays one of the key roles in "breakthrough to Oskol", or somehow somehow. to pull out of the important childbirth "extra" battalions of brigades of the 35th breaks, etc.

More for me, if even the Russian command and some "additional" troops (forces), for example, as a result of forcing the next stage of mobilization deployment, then most likely it will not direct them in the Kursk direction, but in The strip of its "Center", which is now actively rushed "as west" in the Pokrovsky and Toretsky directions (with the latter, apparently, there have already been some tract). Another possible "candidate for disintegration" can be the troops (forces) of the Dnepr ".

However, in view of the current strategic situation, the Russian command will obviously approach the "carefully as possible" (it suspects the Armed Forces of Ukraine in a "malicious" strategic "game" - as if Kursk operation is a great strategic distraction and coercion of Russian command. from the southern operating area of ​​the "out" of their troops, and to prepare and draw again the attack again to the Crimea and the northern coast of Azov).

I will not now dwell on the etymology of the appearance of these "bragged" in the heads of the Russian command. It is constantly "hitting" in some extremums regarding the assessment of the Armed Forces and their command, in general, refusing them the ability to consistently strategic planning, then suspecting large -scale "sparse".

But at this stage, the Russians were obviously mistaken with determining the main content of the Ukrainian plan of a strategic defense operation (in fact, the plan of the summer and autumn campaign of 2024). This is poured into the hesitation that we are seeing now, as to where, how and in what composition to use the bulk of our reserves. 3. Well, in fact, about these reserves. Their volume is evaluated differently.

I watched the estimates of 3 levels at once: as for me, 50-60 thousand-as much as possible to real indicators (this is including all categories-that is, those that are restored in the status of "first-stage reserves" and those that They are formed and unfolded from scratch, etc. ).