The victory of Ukraine - what does it mean? Allies are time to determine the vision of the end of the war

It is time to understand what a victory in Ukraine means for him, says political scientist Andrew Michta in the Atlantic Council column. And after deciding it, to develop a clear plan of action and follow it, not just "helping how much it will be needed. " Russia launched a third large wave of mobilization on the eve of the future spring and summer campaign to seize new lands in Ukraine.

On March 31, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on the beginning of the next conscript campaign, setting a goal at the level of 150,000 new recruits to be military service. It happened after the Russian Duma decided to increase the maximum age of twenty -seven to thirty years last July, which significantly increased the number of conscripts available.

According to Ukrainians, the number of new soldiers, who can be called into the third Russian mobilization campaign, will reach three hundred thousand by June. There are various estimates of the degree of restoration of Russian Land Forces after Russia's initial losses, with some analysts claim that this process is almost completed.

But regardless of these different estimates, the gap between the military capabilities of Russia and Ukraine - and the difference in pure mass - continues to grow rapidly, even though Kiev has recently reduced the conscript age for Ukrainian men from twenty to twenty -five years. The recent successes of Russia at the front, as well as US assistance, approved in Congress only after a few months of delay, suggest that an important point in the decision in the war may occur in the coming months.

While the United States can soon be sent to the forefront of the necessary ammunition and air defense, the Russian offensive seems to be at the initial stage. And this may well create a crisis for the NATO Alliance, much more than the current disputes over the one who spends more on Ukraine.

Given that Russian infantry can take only a few months of preparation before being thrown into battle, as well as the fact that Moscow continues to build new training camps, it is likely that the new offensive will coincide in whole or partially with the anniversary, The 75th NATO Summit in Washington on July 9-11.

According to official Russian propaganda that this war is not only against Ukraine but also against NATO, and that it is a civilization struggle against the "collective event", Putin could take advantage At the moment when he celebrates the three -quarters of a century the restraint of Moscow's imperial ambitions. In this scenario, the US presidential election can be a decisive variable in how the war will end.

(In the European press, there are more extreme scenarios how the war after the US presidential election can end).

Simply put, if Putin makes a serious jerk during the summit, will Baiden administration be able to maintain his "as much as needed" strategy as much as you need? Or, or the breakthrough of Russia in Ukraine will be perceived by the President's team of re-election as an incapable obligation only a few months before voting, especially given that his probable opponent-republican will probably make the US policy failure in Ukraine in his election campaign? Monthly delay with the approval of additional US assistance to Ukraine, as well as the fact that Kyiv has seriously undertaken its defense only six months ago, increase the country's vulnerability and the likelihood that the Russian offensive can lead to a breakthrough or at least to move forward.

However, the biggest problem is the general approach of Biden administration, which is to provide Kyiv as much assistance as it will allow Ukraine to maintain defense, while at the same time depleting Russian military capabilities and limiting the risk of nuclear escalation. This position, occupied by Biden administration, for example, allowed German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, the largest state in Europe, to maintain its strategic ambiguity "Russia should not win, Ukraine should not lose".

Given the supposed despair on land and despite the obvious success of Ukraine at sea, some analysts today really come to believe that the war in Ukraine is moving to the settlement through negotiations. With such a hypothetical settlement, Ukraine will retain its sovereignty and independence, while Russia will retain its territorial heritage in the East, as well as Crimea.

If left aside the fact that such a result will be equivalent to the victory of Russia, these forecasts can be denied the development . Thus, instead of constantly discussing a territorial settlement or a particular agreement, Ukraine and the transatlantic community require the most common vision of victory in Ukraine, around which Kiev and its supporters can unite.

Further, the United States, their allies and partners need a strategy - with appropriate resources - which will allow Ukraine to achieve this victory. In the end, to paraphrase clichés, vision without resources is just hallucinations. Baiden's administration can change Ukraine's course in the coming months.

If the Russians move in Ukraine, there will be two elections in the administration: to continue the course and increase the risk of Ukrainian losses - or to move from the policy "as much as they need to" approach "everything that Ukrainians need to win.

" This will potentially increase the risk of escalation of relations with Russia, but will also eliminate the electoral risk of being accused of a US policy failure in Ukraine, while giving Kiev a chance to take a favorable position for negotiating.

If Ukraine wants to break the situation on the battlefield, it will need to get a large number of long -range artillery for the task of strokes on railway tracks, fuel warehouses, ammunition depots, team points and aerodromes in the depths of the Russian territory. In the absence of these weapons and powers, another Ukrainian frontal attack on the Russian defensive line is likely to again lead to mass casualties of the Ukrainian army.

At the strategic level, Baiden administration and US allies throughout Europe require a serious public conversation about the vision of victory, which goes beyond the statement that Russia cannot win in Ukraine and that the constant commitment of the West to Ukraine remains unwavering. The transatlantic community requires a frank discussion of the final state that it wants to achieve in the war, in clearly defined geostrategic terms, rather than indefinite joint support.