Last Kremlin mobilization: why after the present army set Russia will pause

In Ukraine, many are afraid that Russia will collect a small horde by the end of May by the end of May, and by the end of the summer it is great. The analyst Alexei Kopitko assures that these fears are unfounded, and draws the situation with the replenishment of the army, which has developed from the enemy.

In the US, there is a shift, ideally (!) By mid-May, this should be felt by our troops on the front (5-7 days at the end of formalities and one and a half or two weeks for the delivery of noticeable volumes of air defense missiles, long-range means and ammunition). Russia is going on. Which is accompanied by large -scale shares of cover and speculation. Let's look more. 1.

The common place of conversation of recent months has been the statement that by the end of May, Russia will collect a small horde, and by the end of the summer - great. And first go into a small and then a great decisive offensive. Where do these hordes come from? Rospropaganda and Russian officials have been pushed by the thesis for about a year that up to 45,000 people are voluntarily (ie on the conditions of mercenaries). Z0K is a stable minimum that the Kremlin is swaying.

After the terrorist attack in Crocus, they declared a spike in patriotism of 16,000 volunteers who allegedly stood under the gun a day. Then they clarified that it was in 10 days and that it was also false. All this "stable lie" has some factual basis, as well as a number of features. If very simplified and rough.

In 2023, after the effect of mass mobilization ended and the ZEK resource was exhausted, the Kremlin felt a certain balance of "whip and gingerbread" for the people: they began to lure the material busts in the war, while pushing vulnerable and disadvantaged citizens ( debts, penalties, unemployed, just poor, etc. ). The motivational package in the Russian Federation consists of two parts - federal and regional.

Federal part: the regional package is built in about the same logic, but more diverse in content. The regions give a one -time payment, and sometimes toss it on a monthly basis. Somewhere forgive the debts for the utility, invent some incentives for children (payment for kindergarten, school), bring firewood and more. The top is all covered with a thick layer of propaganda. However, the Russians suffer huge losses.

If you take the minimum numbers - the losses killed, which is visible in Russia itself - then in a month in the Russian Federation publicly bury from 3000 soldiers (about 100 a day). Plus wounded. That is, even according to Russian (!) Data, a third of the voiced inflow of mercenaries is guaranteed to leave. In fact, the influx is smaller, the proportion of those who dropped out is greater.

They were capable of replenishing in the current mode against the backdrop of the deficit of Ukraine's defense forces. As it will be in the summer - depends on the real dynamics of supplies of Western weapons and ammunition. 2. For large-scale actions to overcome the intensified line of fortifications (especially if our army receives support and be able to solve the problem of Russian tactical aviation with its cabin and UMPB) Russians need to accumulate troops in 3-4 months.

In this case, open mass mobilization remains extremely unpopular. In view of this, the following measures ("Batig") have already been taken at the federal level: however, in the fall, the tendency to increase the regional part of the bonus package has been affected. It was one of the markers that they do not collect a planned number of soldiers. Migrants in the army and MIC will not be massively subordinated. Therefore, competition for labor resources increases.

Regional bonuses began to increase many times from the new year in the context of the election campaign. But the most interesting thing - after the elections, this trend has only intensified! The real battle for the population of soldiers, which the subjects of the Federation should transfer to the Federal Center and/or assemble into regional units are now being unfolding. Rich and happy regions literally buy people in less secured areas.

What, not particularly protruding, turned Kadyrov, now publicly announces dozens of governors and even mayors. At the end of 2023, a competitive price for the head of the November for the region amounted to 200 thousand rubles of one -time payment.

The secured regions gave 300+ thousand (for example, in Tatarstan the payment consisted of money of the Ministry of Defense + region + city + enterprises, and even the local DTSAAF was tossed in Kazan under 900 thousand total), the weakest and most awesome subjects of the federation were in central The Federal District - in some places they did not add anything at all. From April 1, prices have increased in some places three to four times.

Krasnodar region already offers 1 million rubles (about $ 10K). Behind him the price tag was put in a million Nizhny Novgorod. Rostov region offered 500 thousand in March for a contract with the Ministry of Defense, and for a contract with a registered (regional) battalion "Don" - 700 thousand. On April 2, the governor of Rostov region Vasyl Golubev announced an order: to increase the basic regional payment to 700 thousand rubles.

Quote: "These funds will be able to receive those who have signed a contract in the Rostov region, regardless of their place of residence or registration" (!). And for a contract with a name battalion now pay 1 million rubles. That is, some bar is installed in a "million for the head" for "decent regions". That will pull up the prices everywhere. St. Petersburg has yet kept 905 thousand. In the Moscow region, regional surcharge in the registered units of the region was 605 thousand.

Moscow publicly promises 50 thousand monthly (!) Surchaling and individual one -time payment. Etc. What should you look for? 3. This is a very visual story of the accumulation of internal imbalances in the Russian Federation: between regions and between different industries. These are legalized internal colonies, where the lives of citizens officially have different costs. Moscow's empty rubles can print enough. For some time this tool is enough.

But the purchase of mercenaries in commodity quantities is still possible, because there is money from the sale of oil that the Kremlin drives into the MIC and the army. Rich regions get a resource to keep their personnel and buy the poor. Plus, the Kremlin has funds to redistribute the social to those subjects of the federation where it has not developed with the defense and other revenue industries. If you disrupt this oil flow, the redistribution mechanism will stop working.

That sharply exacerbates the contradiction within Russia. Our partners probably keep this moment in their heads. And they clearly showed that they are not interested in some sharp changes. In the gradual "drying" - yes, and in the pressing of oxygen - no, not to cause unpredictable convulsions. One of the consequences of the growth of the price tag for mercenaries is the undermining of the whole "ocologue" discourse.

In the regions of the Russian Federation, there are many incidents when the invaders are written off from the army exclusively as a temporarily solvent contingent. No Piece, no sentiments. I chased after money - now your problems. The dead occupier is useful for propaganda, alive - harmful. And more and more Russians understand the real choice and see its consequences.

The rapid increase in the price tag for the rookie may be associated with the feeling that people who, in principle, are ready to go to war for money, end. And further the amount will no longer be of particular importance in the mass set. So - only a whip. Therefore, rich regions are in a hurry to fulfill the norm. To have a backlash of a degree of repression. And this will further increase the pressure in the subjects of the federation, which are also paid mainly with blood.

The Caucasus is already minimal. The Far East was severely injured. Siberia, the Urals and the Volga region pull the main burden now. And in the western regions, large military construction was announced in the Moscow and Leningrad military districts to simulate NATO threats. They need to accumulate professional parts rather than burn them. That is, the unlimited human resource in the Russian Federation is an exaggeration.

Planned floods, planned fires (in Bashkortostan have already begun because of anomalous heat for this period), plus the efforts of the Ukrainian army in the Russian territory will be overloaded by the state apparatus. Slow down mobilization processes. 4. The set of facts generates such a hypothesis.

If the first mass mobilization of Russia has been digested in virtually unnoticed and found mobes, how to replenish, the current tension for the purpose of collecting a large horde by autumn will be much more difficult. And next time, such an operation can be performed only after a considerable period of time, otherwise there is a great risk of going to the release. Let us take away in the summer and autumn - and the Russians will be forced to pause until they find new solutions (if found).

As I wrote - a minimum of one personal drone will be harvested for all herbs. But not everyone is involved in the assault. Therefore, there will be 2-4 devices for each assault. There will be a stable aviation decision (intuitively - by August should be) - and the task for Russian to achieve at least some significant result will be unrealistic. They will not crawl on the ground, the losses will be enormous. That is, apocalyptic scenarios are not basic.

On the contrary, there is an opportunity to influence. The intimidation of Ukraine by the inevitable and fast collapse is the pushing to be satisfied with the small and a way to unwrite the spiral refusal to resist. The situation is really difficult for us. But not hopeless. Two years ago, it was an order of magnitude worse. Avoid internal destabilization. Do not allow the Russians to organize a humanitarian crisis - through preparation. Help the army in a form that is available.